


## Context & latest developments

Israel launched a **massive military campaign attacking vital Iranian infrastructure and strategic sites 13 June**. The campaign heavily targeted the Tehran region, as well as Kermanshah, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Qom and Mashhad. **A third of Iran's missile launchers and 15,000 centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site** were destroyed, according to the Israeli army and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and at least 224 people have been killed across Iran, according to the latest official figures. **Israel's operations**, which were initially focused on military targets, in particular bases and commanders of the army and the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), **have now been extended to places of authority and civilian targets**. The headquarters of Iran's state television station, IRIB, was bombed 16 June, while the Bank Sepah, one of the country's main public banks, was hit by a massive cyberattack 17 June.

### Tehran Region

Confirmed Israeli strikes since June 13, 2025




Data as of June 17, 2025 at 14:30 UTC+2

Map: Scutum Security First (SSF) • Created with Datawrapper

Iranian retaliation, which for the time being has consisted solely of relatively intense **missile fire** in the direction of central and northern Israel, mainly the regions of **Tel Aviv** and **Haifa**, has inflicted 24 fatalities.

## Tel Aviv Region

Confirmed Iranian strikes since June 13, 2025



Data as of June 17, 2025 at 14:30 UTC+2

Map: Scutum Security First (SSF) • Created with Datawrapper

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic's proxies in the region, including **Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen**, have **not yet expressed any clear sign of solidarity with Iran**, with the exception of a reported missile strike from Yemen. On the one hand, this could indicate that the groups are refocusing on national objectives after having been significantly weakened by two months of war initiated by Israel in Lebanon in the case of Hezbollah (September - November 2024) and by a massive bombing campaign by the US army in the case of the Houthis (March - April 2025). On the other hand, **Iran's apparent isolation in this escalation with Israel** suggests that the regime has entered into a logic of survival which had gradually begun in recent months with the ostracisation of its regional allies in successive Israeli military offensives, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, which led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime and the military immobilisation of Hezbollah.

In this setup, the Iranian regime is now deprived of the strike capability it had only a few months ago in the Middle East and appears to be **vulnerable to Israeli war aims**, which remain undetermined. One of the operational supports that Teheran could benefit from in the short term is that of the Shiite militias it has won over in **Iraq**, including the Kata'ib Hezbollah group, which for the time being does not intend to interfere in the Israel-Iran conflict but is trying to dissuade the United States from entering it. The group's secretary general recently warned that if the United States were to *"intervene directly in the conflict, we will strike without hesitation at their interests and their military bases spread across the region"*. In Iraq, such a scenario could either accelerate the withdrawal of US troops or force them to re-engage in a conflict that the Trump administration does not want to resume.


## Current Risks

In view of the considerable volatile nature of the regional situation, there are **emerging and fluctuating risks** that should be taken into account in several countries in the region in the coming weeks:

### Potential air traffic disruption

In addition to Israel and Iran, the countries in the region most affected by the risk of flights being **suspended or postponed** (by the airlines themselves) and **airspace being closed** (by governments) are **Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf States**. As of 17 June, Israeli and Iranian airspace has been completely closed since 13 June, while **Syrian** and **Iraqi** airspace has been **partially closed** due to repeated violations by both Israel and Iran. Iraq, where the majority of scheduled flights are still being cancelled at Baghdad Airport, while Basra Airport only just reopened 17 June, has reported the violations of its airspace to the United Nations Security Council.

The different airspaces of the other countries mentioned above remain open, but **flights are being postponed or cancelled**, sometimes without warning. Several European airlines (**Lufthansa, Transavia**), Turkish carriers (**Turkish Airlines, Pegasus**) and **Emirates** are currently no longer operating flights to the airports of **Beirut (Lebanon) and Amman (Jordan)**.



*Regional air traffic as of 17 June 2025 (17:00 UTC)*

### Risk of protests

If the instability caused by the ongoing conflict continues, there could be an increase in rallies and even **demonstrations of force by regional groups supporting Iran**, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. Spontaneous rallies were reported in the southern suburbs of Beirut on the evening of 13 June, while several pro-Iran demonstrations have been staged in Iraqi cities in the last few days, including one in front of the US Embassy in Baghdad 16 June.

Depending on how the development of the situation, such **rallies could spread to other countries**, as part of a wider effort to oppose Israel's expansion of its interventionist policies in the region.

### Terrorist threat

Although in recent years Iran and its main proxies have somewhat put aside the use of terrorist attacks - which no longer appear to be useful in achieving their strategic objectives after the high-profile attacks carried out in the 1980s, 1990s and up to the early 2000s - this **ability to cause harm** could be used again if the situation is unfavourable to them. Whether on a regional or international scale, the Islamic Republic and its allies still have a network of influence that could enable them to **target Israeli interests around the world, or Western interests in the Middle East**.

## Recommendations

**Jordan and Lebanon:** as a precaution, **consider postponing non-essential travel. Keep away from gatherings** and exercise caution in the vicinity of Western diplomatic interests. **Take shelter** in the event of an air raid or the sighting of missiles flying overhead. In Lebanon, continue to avoid the southern part of the capital and the south of the country.

**Iraq and Syria:** it is advisable to postpone all travel.

**Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman):** travel is still possible. Make sure you have some **flexibility** (accommodation, etc.) in the event of flight postponements, cancellations or airspace closures.

**Israel:** contact the diplomatic authorities for any assistance or evacuation requests. In view of the closure of airspace, **evacuations by land are possible to Jordan** via the three existing crossing points (King Hussein/Allenby, Sheikh Hussein/Bet Shean and Wadi Araba) at set times. In the country, **you must seek shelter whenever there is an air raid**, which is also announced by the [Tzofar app](#) ([Google Play](#) & [App Store](#)).

**Iran:** contact the diplomatic authorities, as evacuation is highly recommended.