

## Context & latest developments

In the night of 23-24 June, US President Donald Trump announced that a **"total ceasefire"** between Israel and Iran would come into effect from 04:00 UTC (in two stages) 24 June, leading to the **"official end" of the "12-day war"** between the two countries. Initially, Iran announced, via Qatar, that it had accepted the ceasefire, which, however, according to a statement by its Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, it would only implement on the condition that Israel stops its "aggression".

Meanwhile, in the final hours before the ceasefire came into force, the **Israel Defence Forces (IDF) carried out several air strikes against Iranian towns**, leaving at least nine people dead in Astaneh-ye Ashrafiyeh (Guilan Province) and the Islamic Republic fired **six rounds of missiles at Israeli territory**, killing at least 5 people in Be'er Sheva. In spite of these casualties, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel accepted the implementation of the ceasefire before two projectiles fired from Iran were intercepted in northern Israel. In response, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said that Israel would "respond forcefully to Iran's violation of the ceasefire", although Iran denied violating the truce, citing "a technical error".

As of 24 June, the **regional security situation remains volatile**, marked by an **extremely fragile ceasefire** that seems to have been imposed primarily by the president of the United States. He has sought to cut short any uncontrolled escalation following the **US military Operation Midnight Hammer** carried out in the night of 21-22 June targeting three major sites in Iran's nuclear programme: Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan.

Furthermore, the United States, warned of Iran's intention to respond to the US operation, did not prevent Iran from **firing retaliatory strikes against its Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar** in the evening of 23 June, believing that the strikes, which were symbolic rather than threatening, would allow the Iranian regime to accept the implementation of the ceasefire without being humiliated, despite the heavy blows it has suffered in the last few days by the Israeli and US armies. American and Iranian diplomatic sources have stated that Iran had in fact voiced its desire to introduce a ceasefire before Israel, which confirms the survival logic of the Iranian regime, which, addressing its popular support base in Iran and the Middle East, recently claimed that a ceasefire had been "imposed on the enemy".

Operation Rising Lion		
The Iranian front, Last updated: Last updated: 23/06/2025 11:00		
Iranian fatalities	Targeted killings of senior military officials	Nuclear scientists killed
<b>430</b>	<b>+25</b>	<b>+12</b>
Military targets attacked by the IDF	Nuclear facilities struck	
<b>+1100</b>	<b>8</b>	
Missile launchers destroyed	Iranian fighter jets targeted	
<b>+300</b> (About 75% of all missile launchers in Iran)	<b>20</b>	
* Sources: IDF, Iranian Ministry of Health; Analysis: Mora Deitch, Nitsan Praytzer.		

INSS estimate of the provisional human and military toll of the Israeli offensive in Iran

## Analysis & Prospective

The continued propaganda rhetoric by the Iranian regime, which is being relayed through various channels, including the state media despite the confinement of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, suggests that the **various strata of power within the Iranian regime remain structured overall**. Furthermore, the US strike carried out 22 June demonstrates that **regime change was not the ultimate aim of Israel's offensive in Iran**, given the **potentially far-reaching consequences on a regional scale**. As a result of the US military and diplomatic intervention, the US president has tried to regain control of the situation by refocusing the objectives of the war against the Iranian regime around the issue of its nuclear programme, in line with the **security imperatives** demanded by other countries in the region, including the **Gulf states**.

On the other hand, the imposition of the ceasefire seems to have been less well accepted on the Israeli side, with the government strongly condemning its alleged violation by Iran, which Donald Trump described as a "potential mistake". The US president also reprimanded Israel 24 June by forcing Benjamin Netanyahu to recall Israeli fighter jets on their way to bomb Teheran, in violation of the ceasefire. It appears that Israel was not particularly keen to safeguard the truce because Benjamin Netanyahu's government wanted a total and unequivocal victory over the Iranian regime, in order to **benefit, on the domestic political arena, from the cost of the operation**, which resulted in 29 deaths in Israel.



*INSS data on Iranian missile launches against Israel (13 to 24 June)*

It should be remembered that the Israeli government is still at threat from a **no-confidence vote** that the Knesset began to consider at a preliminary reading 11 June, a few hours before the launch of Operation Rising Lion in the night of 12-13 June. Unlike the votes of no confidence that have been brought by the opposition in recent months in view of the government's management of the devastating war in Gaza, which is increasingly criticised in Israel, this time the rebellion comes from within the far-right ruling coalition, which is calling for a law to exempt religious school students from military service.

Although the **state of destruction of Iran's nuclear programme remains unknown for the time being** - despite statements by the US president - and **Iran has demonstrated that it is still capable of firing deadly missiles at Israel**, the Israeli government reportedly wanted to continue with the military operation. In the short term, it is likely that Israel could try to **secure the right to intervene in Iran** in the event of a

presumed threat, as it has done in **Lebanon** despite the ceasefire agreed with Hezbollah 18 November 2024, and in another scenario in **Syria**. In this respect, it should be noted that **the truce between Iran and Israel does not include any political aspects providing for in-depth negotiations**, like the most recent ceasefires concluded in the region (Houthi/United States in May 2025, Hamas/Israel in January 2025, Hezbollah/Israel in November 2024), which are more akin to **de-escalation mechanisms** rather than prerequisites for peace processes.

Against this backdrop, the ceasefire between Israel and Iran appears fragile, with **a credible risk of a resumption of hostilities in the short or medium term**, by either side, as soon as an opportunity arises to attack in order to serve national or regional interests. **In the absence of any real talks**, Iran has not stated that it has given up its desire to develop a military nuclear programme, causing concern among several countries, including France, about **the increased risk of clandestine uranium enrichment** in Iran. For the time being, this unstable security environment **continues to expose the countries of the region to the risks inherent in potential new escalations in the Middle East**.

### Potential air traffic disruption

In addition to Israel and Iran, the countries in the region most affected by the risk of flights being **suspended or postponed** (by the airlines themselves) and **airspace being closed** (by governments) are **Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf States**. On 23 June, the airspace of Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Iraq and Kuwait was temporarily completely closed as a result of Iranian retaliatory fire against the US military base at al-Udeid (Qatar). These airspaces gradually reopened on 24 June.

Despite the truce, **several airlines, particularly European ones, are continuing to suspend certain flights to the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Qatar, UAE) for various reasons that are difficult to foresee** (right of flight crews to withdraw, logistical and insurance costs, etc.). As a result, further flight disruptions are expected in the region over the next few days, until flight schedules can be resumed if tensions ease.



*Regional air traffic as of 23 June 2025 (16:00 UTC)*

The risks associated with **socio-political mobilisation and the terrorist threat**, which are tending to increase significantly, still need to be taken into account and are likely to increase if hostilities resume.

## Recommendations

**Jordan and Lebanon:** as a precaution, **consider postponing non-essential travel. Keep away from gatherings** and exercise caution in the vicinity of Western diplomatic interests. **Take shelter** in the event of an air raid or the sighting of missiles flying overhead. In Lebanon, continue to avoid the southern part of the capital and the south of the country.

**Iraq and Syria:** it is advisable to postpone all travel.

**Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman):** travel is still possible. Make sure you have some **flexibility** (accommodation, etc.) in the event of flight postponements, cancellations or airspace closures.

**Israel:** contact the diplomatic authorities for any assistance or evacuation requests. France started evacuating its citizens by military airplanes on June 23. In view of the closure of airspace, **evacuations by land are possible to Jordan** via the three existing crossing points (King Hussein/Allenby, Sheikh Hussein/Bet Shean and Wadi Araba) at set times. In the country, **you must seek shelter whenever there is an air raid**, which is also announced by the Tzofar app (Google Play & App Store).

**Iran:** contact the diplomatic authorities, as evacuation is highly recommended.